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The devastating effects of AIDS and the widespread fear of
contamination at home, work, school, health care facilities
and elsewhere are, sadly, too well known .... I
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 is a terrifying
disease. Those who have watched the deterioration and suffering of
loved ones afflicted with AIDS are forever changed. Those who are
infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),3 the causa-
tive agent of AIDS, face almost certain death.4 This Note chronicles
the legal journey of one case dealing with AIDS, Kerins v. Hartley.5
Kerins I illustrates how the deadly specter of AIDS can cloud
legal judgment. In a case of first impression,6 the California Court of
Appeal held that: (1) a patient who has tested negative for IIV, and
cannot prove probable exposure to either HIV or AIDS, may be al-
lowed to recover for her present fear of AIDS despite the infinitesi-
mal chance of her ever contracting AIDS;7 and (2) a surgeon,
although unaware of his HIV-positive status at the time of surgery,8
may be liable for the intentional tort of battery by virtue of an im-
1. Herbert v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. App. 4th 782, 788, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
709, 712 (1994).
2. AIDS was first recognized in the United States in 1981. BLACK'S MEDICAL
DICrnONARY 14 (Gordon Macpherson ed., 37th ed. 1992). The cause of the syndrome is a
retrovirus-human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-which is responsible for a vast
number of AIDS-related conditions in the late stages of HIV infection. Id. In 1991 the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that at least 10 million people were infected
with HIV, and that one million of those infected were battling AIDS-related complica-
tions. See id. The WHO estimates that by the year 2000 there will be 40 million HIV-
positive individuals worldwide. Id. at 15.
3. Persons are considered infected with HIV if they test positive for its antibodies. Id.
at 14-15. Ultimately, the presence of certain diseases and medical complications may place
the HIV-positive individual into the AIDS category. Id. at 15.
4. Although medical research continues, HIV infection is considered an incurable
condition leading to serious life-threatening illnesses. LL
5. No. B065917, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 1993). For pur-
poses of clarity, the original California Court of Appeal's opinion in Kerins v. Hartley will
hereinafter be referred to as Kerins I, the California Supreme Court opinion will be re-
ferred to as Kerins v. Hartley, and the remand will be referred to as Kerins I. Addition-
ally, because Kerins I was ultimately reversed and the opinion deleted, this Note will use
the LEXIS citation as the opinion remains available on-line.
6. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *2.
7. lId at *33-36.
8. Although the plaintiff, Ms. Kerins, alleged that the defendant, Dr. Gordon, knew
or should have known of his HIV-positive status at the time of the surgical procedure, the
defendants claimed that Dr. Gordon was unaware of his condition until five days after the
plaintiff's surgery. Id. at *3, *6. Whether Dr. Gordon's desire to be tested in the first
instance indicated a level of awareness that might be construed as approaching knowledge
is beyond the scope of this Note.
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plied, rather than an express, condition placed on the patient's con-
sent-to be operated on by an HIV-free physician.9
The decision was alarming for several reasons. First, it allowed a
fear of AIDS claim to go to the jury absent proof of probable
exposure to the disease.10 Unless plaintiffs are required to allege and
prove exposure as a threshold matter, those who live with HIV/AIDS
become potential victims of spurious claims. Second, even where it is
conceivable that a plaintiff might be genuinely distressed by the possi-
bility of having come into contact with IV/AIDS, without requiring
proof of exposure the court established a dangerous precedent al-
lowing recovery for a fear that had no basis in fact. Third, the court
allowed recovery when there was no indication that the defendant
physician violated the relevant medical standard of care at the time of
the incident." Finally, by allowing the battery claim, the court sanc-
tioned holding health care workers liable in intentional tort for failing
to respect what was, in essence, an implied condition to the patient's
consent-because no express condition had been placed on that con-
sent as defined by California case law. 2 In summary, faced with a
novel situation involving a feared disease, the appellate court in Ker-
ins I abandoned established principles of liability 3 -principles that
balance patient rights, medical practices, and economic incentives-to
fashion a remedy for an undeserving plaintiff.
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded Kerins I.14 Unfortunately, however, the supreme court's
terse, one-sentence opinion'5 contained no analysis, no articulation of
policy, and little guidance. The case was thereby remanded without
explanation to an appellate court that had been unable to decipher the
issues initially. The reversal saved California from joining the minor-
ity of jurisdictions that sanction fear of AIDS as a means of monetary
9. Id. at *14-19. Although the Kerins I court stated that the condition placed on the
consent, when liberally construed, could have been express, it is not an express condition
as defined by California case law. See infra text accompanying notes 283-90.
10. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *33-34.
11. See infra note 272 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Centers for Dis-
ease Control (CDC) standards.
12. See infra part V for a discussion of what constitutes an express condition in
California.
13. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing history of negligent conduct standards).
14. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
15. "The above-entitled review is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appel-
late District Two, with directions to vacate its decision and to reconsider the cause in light
of Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co .... " Id.
April 1995] 1101
1102 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
recovery without exposure to the disease.16 Regrettably, however, the
supreme court failed to separately address the battery claim.17 As a
result, the door may remain open for future claims based on the the
subsequent remand, Kerins I, theory of an implied condition to valid
consent.
Part II of this Note details the trial and appellate courts' reason-
ing in Kerins L Part IIl provides a historical framework of fear of
AIDS cases at the time of Kerins I, and the lack of informed consent
cases alleging a cause of action in battery rather than negligence. Part
IV details the reliance on the California Supreme Court's decision in
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,118 which forced the court of ap-
peal to reverse its holding in Kerins I. Finally, Part V discusses how
both the supreme court's reversal and the subsequent remand, Kerins
II, leave the battery claim without resolution.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts of Kerins I
In June of 1986, Jean R. Kerins sought attention for severe ab-
dominal pain from the Women's Medical Group of Santa Monica
(WMG). 19 Ms. Kerins's physician, Dr. James S. Gordon, diagnosed a
uterine fibroid tumor and recommended surgery.20 Faced with sur-
gery, Ms. Kerins expressed concern about possible transmission of
AIDS if a blood transfusion became necessary. 21 Dr. Gordon advised
her to store some of her own blood should the need for transfusion
arise.2 Ms. Kerins also asked Dr. Gordon, " 'How is your health?' 23
to which Dr. Gordon replied, "'Well, I go to the gym regularly and I
run every morning.' "2
On November 5, 1986, Dr. Gordon successfully removed the tu-
mor.25 Nothing in the "detailed operative report of the surgery [indi-
16. See discussion of Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993), infra part II.A.2.
17. See Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d at 906, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
18. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
19. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *2.
20. Id. at *2-3.
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Ms. Kerins).
24. Id. (quoting Dr. Gordon).
25. Id. at *3.
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cated] that any cuts were sustained by Dr. Gordon, or that there were
any other unusual occurrences"'2 6 during the surgical procedure.2 7
Sometime between November 3 and 6, 1986, Dr. Gordon was
tested for IV.' 8 On November 10, 1986, five days after Ms. Kerins's
surgery, Dr. Gordon learned that he was HIY-positive.29 Within a
short time Dr. Gordon revealed his HIV-positive status to his partners
at WMG.3 0 Dr. Gordon continued his practice until January of 1987,
when he fell victim to pneumocystic pneumonia, an AIDS-related
complication.3 '
When Dr. Gordon was well enough to return to practice, his part-
ners at WMG refused his services.3 2  Dr. Gordon then filed suit
against his partners for AIDS discrimination.3 3 On April 21,1988, Dr.
Gordon publicly announced his suit in a televised news broadcast. 4
Ms. Kerins, seeing the broadcast, was tested for HJV within one day.35
Approximately two weeks later Ms. Kerins received her results. She
was HIV-negative 6
According to data relied on in 1986, HIV is detectable in ninety-
five percent of infected individuals within six months of exposure.37
Ms. Kerins tested HIV-negative more than eighteen months after her
surgery, making her risk of contracting AIDS during that surgery ex-
tremely remote.3
26. Id.
27. Id. Notably, up until that date, there had been no documentation of BIV transmis-
sion from surgeon to patient during an exposure-prone procedure. 1d. at *7-8.
28. Id. at *3.
29. Id.
30. Id. Dr. Gordon's partners, Dr. Marki J. Knox and Dr. Karen Blanchard, were also
named as defendants in the case, as was WMG. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *4 n.1. Pneumocystosis pneumonia results from an infection with pneumo-
cystis carinii, a lung infection characterized by cysts. STEA DMAN'S MEDIcAL DICroNARY
1224 (25th ed. 1990).
32. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *4 n.1.
33. Id. at *3-4.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *3, *5.
36. Id. at *5.
37. Id. Ms. Kerins's expert witness, Dr. William T. O'Connor, testified that current
tests were even more accurate-99.8%. Id. at *5 n.2. Yet Ms. Kerins has refused to be
retested since 1988 to determine if she has become HIV-positive. Id.
38. Id. at *23 & n.6. First, Ms. Kerins's own statistical data supported the fact that the
risk of percutaneous, that is, through-the-skin injury to physicians during surgery that
could cause blood-to-blood exposure is approximately 6.9%. Id. at *23 n.6. Additionally,
the actual risk of HIV transmission from surgeon to patient via percutaneous exposure is
estimated at 0.3%. See Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During
Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, Mormorry & MoRTATY WKLY. REP., July 12,
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Nevertheless, Ms. Kerins filed suit in Los Angeles County Supe-
rior Court against Dr. Gordon39 and WMG, seeking
general and punitive damages, including health care ex-
penses, lost past and future earnings, and compensation for
severe mental anguish and emotional distress, which she
allegedly suffered upon discovering that Dr. Gordon per-
formed surgery upon her to remove a large uterine fibroid
tumor at a time when he was infected with [-]uman
[I]mmunodeficiency [V]irus. 40
B. The Trial Court and Appellate Decisions
1. Procedural history
Ms. Kerins's complaint included causes of action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress and battery.41 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, contending that Ms. Kerins had not suffered any
legally compensable injury.42 The trial court granted the defendants'
1991, at 1, 3 [hereinafter MMWR]. Moreover, Ms. Kerins conceded that the probability of
conversion from her 1988 HIV-negative status to a 1993 HIV-positive result is no more
than one in 20, or 5%. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *23 n.6.
From the 1988 data available at the time of Ms. Kerins's test, the defendants conserva-
tively calculated that her risk of developing AIDS was at most one in 300,000. Id Based
on more current data, and assuming that Ms. Kerins would still test HIV-negative, the
defendants estimated that Ms. Kerins's risk of developing AIDS is one in 24 million. Id
As previously stated, there is no known case of HIV being transmitted from physician
or health care worker to patient-in surgery or otherwise. Admittedly, there has been
great speculation as to the five patients of an AIDS-infected Florida dentist who became
HIV-positive. See Larry Gostin, CDC Guidelines on HIV or HBV-Positive Health Care
Professionals Performing Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 140, 141 (1991). The CDC, however, has not been able to establish conclusively how
the transmission occurred. Id Furthermore, it has been noted that the dentist's proce-
dures for infection control were substandard: The dentist used the same gloves on more
than one patient and did not sterilize his instruments. Id As a result, an AIDS authority
has signaled that "the Florida case appears so unusual it would be unfair to base public
policy on the assumption that HIV could be easily transmitted in a dental practice." Id
39. Ms. Mary Kathleen Hartley has since been substituted for Dr. Gordon as special
administrator of his estate after his death from AIDS on July 11, 1990. Kerins I, 1993 Cal.
App. LEXIS 786, at *1-2.
40. Id
41. Id. at *12-19. The complaint also set forth causes of action for intentional misrep-
resentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id at *36 n.9. The trial court,
however, had no occasion to consider those additional causes of action because the defend-
ants did not move for their summary adjudication. Id. Therefore, the appellate court in
Kerins I did not consider these causes of action in its opinion. Id Accordingly, this Note
does not address these additional causes of action.
42. Id at *11-12.
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motion for summary judgment.43 The grounds were twofold: (1) Ms.
Kerins's fear of AIDS was unreasonable as a matter of law; and (2) no
battery occurred because Dr. Gordon had performed the agreed-upon
procedure.44
2. The trial court's reasoning
a. the emotional distress cause of action
The trial court felt that Ms. Kerins's fear of AIDS was unreasona-
ble as a matter of law pursuant to Thing v. La Chusa.45 Thing created
a bright-line rule regarding bystander recovery for emotional dis-
tress. 46 In Thing, a minor child named John Thing was struck by an
automobile.47 His mother, who was nearby, did not see or hear the
incident, but was told of the event by her daughter.' When Mrs.
Thing first saw John, he was bloody and unconscious; she believed him
to be dead.49 Mrs. Thing sued the driver of the automobile for the
emotional shock and injury to her nervous system caused by the
driver's negligence.5 0 The Thing court held that the plaintiff could not
recover for the distress that she experienced upon learning that a neg-
ligent driver injured her minor son, because she did not personally
observe the incident.5 '
Unlike the plaintiff in Thing, Ms. Kerins was not a bystander in
the operating room-she was the direct victim of Dr. Gordon's al-
leged negligence. Therefore, the trial court must have drawn an anal-
ogy to Thing to avail itself of the California Supreme Court's previous
policy determinations in the area of emotional distress.52 Mrs. Thing
could not recover for her distress because, as a matter of policy, she
simply had not met the settled criteria for establishing bystander dis-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
46. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
47. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
51. Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
52. See id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (stating that "the right to
recover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited .... [P]olicy considera-
tions include bbth the burden on the courts in applying vaguely defined criteria and the
importance of limiting the scope of liability for negligence.... A 'bright line in this area of
the law is essential.' " (quoting Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267,277,758 P.2d 582,588,250
Cal. Rptr. 254, 260 (1988))).
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tress53-regardless of the depth and validity of the distress she
experienced.
Similarly, the Kerins I trial court reasoned that absent any proof
of probable exposure to HIV, her IIV-negative status, and the ex-
tremely remote risk of her ever becoming HIV-positive, Ms. Kerins's
fear of developing AIDS was unreasonable as a matter of law. 4 This
was not a question of fact for a jury's determination, but rather a
question of law that could be resolved by relying on the available sta-
tistical data.' Therefore, without proof, or even allegation of prob-
able exposure, and with no symptoms of the disease or its causative
agents, the trial court found Ms. Kerins's fear unreasonable based
upon the public policy established in Thing. 6
Although Kerins I was a case of first impression in California, 7
the trial court's rationale was consistent with the majority jurisdiction
approach in fear of AIDS cases: Absent proof of probable exposure
to HIV/AIDS, or proof of HJV/AIDS infection, fear of AIDS is un-
reasonable as a matter of law. 8
53. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81 (holding that in absence
of physical injury or impact to plaintiff, damages for emotional distress should be recover-
able only if plaintiff: "(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene
of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury
to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that
which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness" (footnotes omitted)).
54. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *20-21. Additionally, the trial court found
Ms. Kerins's refusal to be retested since 1988 a factor that weighed against the reasonable-
ness of her fear of developing AIDS. Respondents' Brief on Appeal at 22 n.14, Kerins v.
Hartley, 17 Cal. App. 4th 713, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (1993) (No. B065917). The trial court
stated: "'I suspect the only reason [plaintiff] hasn't been retested ... is that [ ] the only
thing that can prove [is] things that are bad for her [case], namely, she still doesn't have
H.I.V. and that is what she doesn't want the jury ever to know.'" Id. (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting trial court). Ms. Kerins's explanation for her failure to be retested is that it
would be "'possibly professionally damaging'" to her. Id. at 7 n.5 (quoting Ms. Kerins's
statements to trial court). HIV test results in California, however, are confidential. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West Supp. 1994). Therefore, it is the filing of an
action that makes such test results public and potentially "professionally damaging," not
the actual testing, which, by law, is confidential.
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591,608, 691 P.2d 642, 652, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 886, 896 (1984) (stating that reasonableness of fear of future disease after exposure
to pesticide DBCP is principally predicated on whether fear is consistent with scientific
data regarding effects of exposure to DBCP).
56. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *22-23.
57. Id- at *2.
58. See id. at *24-26. For a discussion of the majority approach to fear of AIDS cases
at the time of Kerins I, see infra part HI.A.1.
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b. the battery cause of action
The trial court reasoned that Dr. Gordon successfully performed
the operation Ms. Kerins consented to-the removal of the fibroid
tumor.5 9 Therefore, under the authority of Cobbs v. Grant,60 which
held that the theory of battery is reserved for operations to which the
patient has not consented,61 there was no battery as a matter of law
because there was no intentional deviation from the consent given.62
Interestingly, it was only after the grant of summary judgment
based on Cobbs that Ms. Kerins first presented her "express condi-
tion" theory of battery.63 Ms. Kerins alleged that her situation was
more akin to those of Ashcraft v. King64 and Grieves v. Superior
Court65 than the one presented in Cobbs.66  Both Ashcraft and
Grieves illustrate how consent can be conditioned on an express re-
quest; if that request is disregarded, the consent becomes invalid.6 7
Therefore, relying on Ashcraft and Grieves, Ms. Kerins alleged that
she created an express condition when she asked Dr. Gordon, "How is
your health?"-an express condition to be operated on by a healthy,
HIV-free doctor.68 Thus, Ms. Kerins's new contention was that she
did not consent to the operation performed because the express con-
dition of being operated on by a healthy, HIV-free doctor was vio-
lated, thereby vitiating her consent.69
The trial court's denial of the motion for reconsideration in light
of Ms. Kerins's new express-condition theory was significant.70 Ap-
parently, the trial court felt that the Ashcraft and Grieves fact patterns
59. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *11-12.
60. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). For a full discussion of Cobbs
v. Grant, see infra part IlI.B.1.
61. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
62. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *12.
63. IM at *16-17 (stating that "express condition" theory was first presented in Ms.
Kerins's reply to defendant's opposition to her motion for reconsideration).
64. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991). In Ashcraft, the court of appeal
held that the evidence was sufficient under Cobbs to allege a battery because consent to
operate was conditioned on the use of only family-donated blood. Id at 609-10, 278 Cal.
Rptr. at 902-03. For a full discussion of Ashcraft v. King, see infra part Im.B.2.
65. 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984). In Grieves, the court of appeal
held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action in battery
because an issue of fact existed as to whether Mrs. Grieves conditioned her consent to a
postpartum tubal ligation on the birth of a healthy child. Id. at 165-66, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
560. For a full discussion of Grieves, see infra part IILB.2.
66. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
67. See infra part III.B.2.
68. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *16-17.
69. Id. at *14.
70. Id. at *11.
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were not applicable to the present situation. The trial court stated
that no battery occurred as a matter of law under the authority of
Cobbs-the judgment did not rely on Ashcraft or Grieves in its deter-
nination of the case.7'
The logic of the trial court was as follows: (1) In order to state a
cause of action in battery-which excludes consent-based opera-
tions-an apparent consent must never have become operative be-
cause the defendant disregards an express condition as in Ashcraft
and Grieves;72 (2) Ms. Kerins's question-"How is your health?"-
was not an express condition, as were the conditional consents given
in Ashcraft and Grieves;73 therefore, (3) Ashcraft and Grieves are dis-
tinguishable from Kerins and, according to Cobbs, no battery oc-
curred because Dr. Gordon performed the operation to which Ms.
Kerins had consented.74
3. The appellate court's reasoning in Kerins I
The appellate court in Kerins I reversed the holding of the trial
court on both causes of action, finding material issues of fact that pre-
cluded affirmance of the summary judgment.75 Specifically, the Kerins
I court reversed the trial court's determination as to the reasonable-
ness of Ms. Kerins's fear of AIDS and the possibility of the occurrence
of a battery. The Kerins I court held that (1) Ms. Kerins's fear of
AIDS could be reasonable, even absent proof of exposure to, or infec-
tion with, HIV/AIDS,76 pursuant to the Maryland Court of Appeals'
decision in Faya v. Almaraz ;77 and (2) there was a triable issue of fact
as to whether Ms. Kerins's question concerning Dr. Gordon's health
constituted an express condition that the operation be performed by a
healthy doctor.78
a. the reasonableness of Ms. Kerins's fear of AIDS
The appellate court in Kerins I did not find Ms. Kerins's fear of
AIDS unreasonable as a matter of law, even though the court noted
that Ms. Kerins could not offer any evidence of exposure to HIV to
71. L at *12-14.
72. See id. at *16-17.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at *35-36.
76. See iL at *33-34.
77. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). For a full discussion of Faya v. Almaraz, see infra part
mI.A.2.
78. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *17.
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controvert Dr. Gordon's testimony.79 The only evidence proffered by
Ms. Kerins was the data on the risk of transmission of HIV from phy-
sician to patient during surgery.80 In fact, the court stated that Ms.
Kerins's data "tends to support [Dr. Gordon's] claim that, statistically
speaking, the risk is minuscule that an infected surgeon will actually
suffer a percutaneous injury which results in HIV transmission to a
patient."81 Despite Ms. Kerins's inability to prove exposure to HIV,82
and the data supporting the remote risk of her actual exposure to
HIV, the Kerins I court allowed Ms. Kerins to go forward with her
fear of AIDS claim.
i. the Faya v. Almaraz decision
After cataloging the majority approach with an "impressive array
of so-called AIDS-phobia cases,"83 Kerins I ultimately relied on the
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Faya v. Almaraz,84 a case it
deemed "remarkably like appellant's."85 Almaraz involved a surgeon
specializing in breast cancer who was HIV-positive at the time he per-
formed two surgeries.8 6
79. 1& at *23. It has been argued, however, that patients under general anesthesia are
unfairly prejudiced if forced to prove exposure, as they are totally unaware of the events at
the time of possible exposure. See Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 337. Although it is undisputed
that general anesthesia forecloses the possibility of a plaintiff observing events that might
cause exposure, being HIV-positive after surgery performed by an HIV-infected doctor
may obviate the need to actually observe exposure. If it could be proven that there were
no other independent sources that could have caused the plaintiff's HIV infection, expo-
sure from the HIV-positive physician could reasonably, albeit circumstantially, be inferred.
80. See MMWR, supra note 38, at 3.
81. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *23; see discussion supra note 38.
82. The issue regarding proof of exposure is the defining line between the minority and
majority approaches to fear of AIDS cases. The majority approach-embraced by the trial
court-requires allegation or demonstration of probable exposure to HIV. See, e.g., Burk
v. Sage Prods., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that plaintiff stuck by discarded
needle could not establish HIV exposure because plaintiff could not show needle had been
used on AIDS patient, and plaintiff tested HIV-negative 13 months after incident).
Conversely, the minority approach-exemplified by Almaraz and relied on by the
appellate court-states that the "requirement that plaintiffs must allege actual transmis-
sion [of HIV] would unfairly punish them for lacking the requisite information to do so."
Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 337. The minority and majority approaches are discussed in depth
infra part m.A.1-2.
83. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *25. For a discussion of the majority posi-
tion that absent proof of exposure to H1V/AIDS, fear of AIDS is unreasonable and
presents no legally cognizable injury, see infra part III.A.1.
84. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
85. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *29.
86. Id.
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Dr. Rudolf Almaraz, a surgeon at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Bal-
timore, had been aware of his HIV-positive status since 1986.87 In
1988 and 1989, respectively, Dr. Almaraz performed surgery on Sonja
Fayal and Perri Mahoney Rossi.89 Dr. Almaraz was not diagnosed
with full-blown AIDS90 until October 27, 1989; thus, he knew he was
HIV-positive at the time of Ms. Faya's surgery, and that he had devel-
oped full-blown AIDS at the time of Ms. Rossi's surgery.91
Dr. Almaraz died of AIDS on November 16, 1990.92 Ms. Faya
and Ms. Rossi learned of the surgeon's AIDS-related death from a
newspaper story in December 1990, over one year after Ms. Rossi's
surgery and about twenty months after Ms. Faya's last procedure.93
Ms. Faya and Ms. Rossi were tested for the HIV virus at that point;
both were IEV-negative. 94
Ms. Faya and Ms. Rossi sued Dr. Almaraz's estate95 for "negli-
gence, negligent failure to obtain the patients' informed consent,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 95 Dr. Al-
maraz's estate ified a demurrer to the complaints, and the trial court
dismissed the action, stating that the claims did not present a legally
87. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 329.
88. Faya's 1988 surgery was a partial mastectomy. Id. She had another operation, re-
moval of an axillary hematoma, in March 1989. Id
89. Rossi's 1989 operation was the removal of a benign lump from her breast. Id.
90. The term "full-blown AIDS" is generally used to signal the HIV-positive patient's
first diagnosis of an ailment known to be indicative of acute immune dysfunction. Id. Dr.
Almaraz suffered from cytomegalovirus retinitis, a type of eye infection. Id. The initial
diagnosis of Dr. Almaraz's full-blown AIDS was confirmed by a second physician on No-
vember 17, 1989. Id.
Other illnesses that signal full-blown AIDS are (1) Kaposi's sarcoma, a type of cancer;
(2) pneumocystis carinli pneumonia; (3) cytomegalovirus infections of the gastrointestinal
tract and eye; (4) mycobacterium avium-intracellulare, a type of tuberculosis; and (5) se-
vere prolonged herpes or yeast infections. Id
91. This is the most significant difference between Almaraz and Kerins I: Dr. Almaraz
knew that he was HIV-positive at the time of his surgeries, but there was uncontroverted
evidence that Dr. Gordon had no knowledge of his HIV-positive status prior to Ms. Ker-
ins's surgery-he did not receive his test results until after the procedure was performed.
Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *3. In this sense the Almaraz case is remarkably
unlike Kerins L
92. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 329.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 329, 331.
95. The Johns Hopkins Hospital was also named as a defendant in the suit. Id at 329-
30. This Note, however, does not explore the agency and vicarious liability theories of an
employer whose employee is infected with HIV/AIDS.
96. Id at 330. Additionally, Faya alleged negligent misrepresentation and breach of
contract, and Rossi alleged loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id
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cognizable injury because the plaintiffs did not allege exposure to HIV
during surgery and were not HIV-positive. 97
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that under the facts presented, Ms. Faya's and Ms. Rossi's fear with
regard to developing AIDS was not unreasonable as a matter of law.98
The court felt that the majority jurisdiction threshold to recovery-
allegation of exposure to AIDS-unfairly punished the plaintiffs for
lacking the requisite information to know if exposure occurred.99
However, the court went on to state that the plaintiffs' fear of
developing AIDS might be deemed unreasonable after the receipt of
their HIV-negative test results because "there is current credible evi-
dence of a 95% certainty that one will test positive for the AIDS virus,
if at all, within six months after exposure to it."' 00 The court stated:
Once [the plaintiffs] learned of their HIV-negative status
more than a year after their respective surgeries, the possibil-
ity of their contracting AIDS from Dr. Almaraz became ex-
tremely unlikely and thus, as a matter of law, might be
deemed unreasonable. Therefore, [the plaintiffs] may only
recover for their fear and its physical manifestations which
may have resulted from Almaraz's alleged negligence for the
period constituting their reasonable window of anxiety-the
period between which they learned of Almaraz's illness and
received their HIV-negative results.1 1
Although the Almaraz opinion allowed recovery for emotional
distress absent proof of HIV exposure, the court established definite
parameters that limited its holding. The Almaraz court held that the
period of recovery was limited specifically to the time that the fear of
acquiring the disease would have been reasonable; as soon as informa-
tion that made the fear unreasonable was or would have been avail-
able to the plaintiff, the fear became unreasonable as a matter of
law.10
2
Kerins I agreed with the basic principle of Almaraz: Whether or
not exposure to HIV/AIDS can be proven, the fear of developing the
disease after a surgical procedure performed by an HIV-infected phy-
97. Id at 330-31.
98. Id. at 336.
99. Id. at 336-37.
100. Id at 337 (citation omitted).
101. Id
102. Id. at 337 n.10.
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sician becomes unreasonable only after certain events occur.' 03 How-
ever, Kerins I seemed to part from the Almaraz decision when it laid
down its criteria for exactly when the fear of developing AIDS be-
comes unreasonable as a matter of law."° ' The Almaraz court formu-
lated a bright-line equation for the unreasonableness of the plaintiffs'
fear-as soon as an BIV-negative test result was or would have been
available to abate the fear, the fear becomes unreasonable as a matter
of law.10 5 In contrast, Kerins I fashioned a three-part test to deter-
mine unreasonable fear absent proof of exposure, and held that Ms.
Kerins's
unabated emotional distress became unreasonable, ergo, not
compensable, once the following events occurred: she re-
ceived access to the operative report and/or in some other
manner received assurances that no actual exposure to Dr.
Gordon's blood had occurred; she received test results nega-
tive for the presence of HIV antibodies; and she had the op-
portunity to obtain counseling on the accuracy and reliability
of the testing methods employed and the very remote
probability of [becoming HIV-positive] more than 18 months
after surgery.
10 6
By characterizing the test as it did, the Kerins I court did not give
California a bright-line "unreasonable, ergo, noncompensable" Al-
maraz standard. The Almaraz court clearly stated that recovery can
only be obtained for the time that would have elapsed between the
knowledge of a possible HIV transmission and the receipt of HJV-
negative results-whether or not testing is done." 7 The Kerins I
court, on the other hand, did not state that the clock stops once the
information becomes available to the plaintiff-the limits placed on
the duration of the fear were far less restrictive. 0 8
Additionally, Kerins I added two requirements to the Almaraz
test: (1) counseling with regard to the accuracy of the testing method;
103. See Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *33-34.
104. See id at *35.
105. More specifically, the Alnaraz opinion states that
the window of anxiety closes once satisfactory information becomes available that
puts to rest the fear of injury. Hence, even had the [plaintiffs] not undergone
immediate blood testing, their recovery span would be limited to the same dura-
tion, for the fear-relieving information, if known to them, would have been avail-
able for their retrieval.
Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 337 n.10.
106. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *35.
107. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 337 n.10.
108. See Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *35.
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and (2) access to the operative report "and/or" assurances that no
exposure occurred.10 9 This tripartite standard, contrasted with the
bright-line rule of Almaraz, would have been much more difficult to
apply on a case-by-case basis.110 Most important, however, the Kerins
I test did not restrict the time that may elapse before the plaintiff's
fear becomes unreasonable for failure to avail herself of the fear-re-
lieving information."1
ii. the Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals analogy
The Kerins I court drew an analogy to Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals"2 in support of its decision that Ms. Kerins's initial fear
of developing AIDS was not unreasonable as a matter of law.11 3 The
plaintiff in Molien, Stephen Molien, sued a doctor and a hospital for
negligent infliction of emotional distress because the doctor had incor-
rectly diagnosed and treated his wife for syphilis." 4 Mrs. Molien was
then advised to have Mr. Molien examined to determine if he had
109. Ld.
110. Assume that HIV-test results are available to a potential plaintiff within five days
after an HIV test. Under Almaraz, compensation for emotional distress based on fear of
AIDS can only encompass the time between the knowledge of the possible HIV transmis-
sion and the five-day wait for the negative test result. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 337 & n.10.
Additionally, the Almaraz court stated that the measurement starts when the plaintiff
learns of the possible exposure and could have taken an HIV test-regardless of when the
plaintiff actually decides to take the test. See id.
Conversely, under the Kerins I tripartite standard, there is no requirement as to when
the plaintiff should or could take an HIV test. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *35.
Therefore, if a plaintiff is fearful-or worse, in denial-when does the clock stop? What if
the plaintiff waits one year to take the test? Does the time period of compensation then
become one year and five days?
Additionally, the Kerins I court required "counseling" regarding the accuracy of the
testing. Id. How long might this add to the period of compensation? What defines "coun-
seling"? What amount of "counseling" is sufficient? What if the "counseling" that the
plaintiff needs to truly accept the HIV-negative test as accurate is one year of therapy?
The compensation period then becomes the one year needed to take the test, five days to
get the result, and another year of "counseling."
Finally, the Kerins I court required access to the medical report "and/or" assurances as
to lack of exposure to HIV. Id. What constitutes an "assurance"? Is it verbal or written?
What defines access to a medical report? Is a photocopy sufficient? Does one need the
assurance and the report? A hypothetical plaintiff could use the language in Kerins I to
support yet another period of possible compensation. Ultimately, the Kerins I standard
becomes one of flexible judicial discretion rather than Almaraz's reasonable formula for
emotional compensation.
111. Id.
112. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
113. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *34-35.
114. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal, Rptr. at 832.
Apr il 1995] 1113
1114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
transmitted the disease to his wife." 5 Mr. Molien's tests revealed that
he was not infected, and therefore not the source of his wife's alleged
infection.
1 6
Although Mr. Molien tested negative for syphilis, the fact that it
is known to be a sexually transmitted disease caused Mrs. Molien to
believe that her husband had engaged in an extramarital affair. 17 As
a result of Mrs. Molien's misdiagnosis and the tensions it created, the
Moliens' marriage dissolved."18
Mr. Molien brought suit for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress and loss of consortium.1 9 The trial court sustained demurrers to
both causes of action, and Mr. Molien appealed. 20 The Supreme
Court of California, in a landmark decision,' 2 1 held that Mr. Molien's
causes of action should not have been dismissed 22 because the col-
lapse of his marriage resulting from Mrs. Molien's erroneous syphilis
diagnosis was reasonably foreseeable.'2 As such, Mr. Molien was al-
lowed to go back to the trial court and prove the extent of his emo-
tional distress.
On the basis of Molien, the Kerins I court stated that the "initial
alarm [Ms. Kerins felt] at hearing news that her surgeon had risked
infecting patients with AIDS cannot be dismissed as unreasonable as a
matter of law."'" There are, however, facts that distinguish Molien
from Kerins I.
Mr. Molien was permitted recovery for genuine emotional dis-
tress after his wife was erroneously diagnosed with a serious dis-
ease. 1' Unlike Molien, Kerins I dealt with the fear of contracting a
disease in the future. 26 Additionally, Ms. Kerins was never told that
she in fact had been exposed to AIDS or had contracted AIDS-
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
118. Id., 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
119. Id., 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
120. Id.
121. The Molien decision is considered an epic one because it was one of the first deci-
sions that permitted an action for emotional distress regardless of whether there was any
resulting physical injury from the emotional disturbance. See id. at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821,
167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The trend toward discarding the requirement of physical harm as a
result of the emotional distress started with Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
122. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
123. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
124. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *35.
125. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
126. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *7.
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while Mrs. Molien was positively, although erroneously, diagnosed
with syphilis.
The Kerins I court's reliance on Molien was misplaced. Molien
permitted recovery for a mistaken diagnosis of a serious disease which
caused the breakup of a marriage.127 Ms. Kerins had not faced an
erroneous diagnosis-in fact she had been assured that her chance of
ever contracting AIDS was essentially nonexistent.1'
b. a battery occurred if Ms. Kerins's consent was conditional
The Kerins I court held that the trial court's reading of Cobbs v.
Grant'2 9 was "unduly restrictive."' 3 °  In Cobbs, the California
Supreme Court limited the intentional tort of battery to situations
where the surgeon performs an operation to which the patient has not
consented.'3' The trial court relied on Cobbs to foreclose Ms. Ker-
ins's cause of action for battery because the operation Dr. Gordon
performed was the one to which Ms. Kerins had consented. 32
The Kerins I court disagreed with the trial court's determination.
The Kerins I court reasoned that Ms. Kerins's question to Dr.
Gordon-"How is your health?"-and the storing of her blood
presented a factual question as to whether Ms. Kerins's consent was
conditional, and thus should be resolved by the trier of fact.
1 33
The court in Kerins I conceded that Ms. Kerins's pleadings had
not alleged that an express condition had been placed on her consent
until she filed her response to the defendants' opposition to the mo-
tion for reconsideration. 34  Nevertheless, the Kerins I court stated
that Ms. Kerins's question, "How is your health?" might have placed
127. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
128. This kind of "intangible injury" is exactly the type of emotional distress claim spe-
cifically deemed uncompensable in previous policy determinations by the California
Supreme Court. See, eg., Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 463, 563 P.2d 871, 872,
138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 316 (1977) (stating that due to "the intangible nature of the injury...
we decline ... to permit recovery"); Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 450, 563
P.2d 858, 864-65, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 308-09 (1977) (stating that "subsequent authority
support[s] our decision in this case to deny a cause of action founded upon purely intangi-
ble injury"); see infra part IH.A for a comparison of Baxter, Borer, and Kerins L
129. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
130. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *19.
131. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 240-41, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
132. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *11-12.
133. See id at *17-19.
134. I& at *16-17.
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an express condition on her surgery-the condition of being operated
on by a doctor free of HIIV infection.
135
As a result, the Kerins I court held that a jury should have deter-
mined whether the question, "How is your health?" and storing one's
own blood indicated an express condition as laid down by Ashcraft
36
and Grieves.37 The Kerins I court stated that, in liberally construing
Ms. Kerins's pleadings, facts could be established that arguably sup-
ported Ms. Kerins's contention that her consent was expressly condi-
tioned on the operation being performed by a healthy doctor.' 38
Further supporting its holding that a legally cognizable cause of
action for battery may exist, the Kerins I opinion cited Rains v. Supe-
rior Court.'39 In Rains, patients of a group of physically abusive psy-
chiatrists brought an action alleging battery, and the court of appeal
held that the misrepresentation of the therapeutic purpose of an
otherwise offensive contact vitiates consent. 40
Ms. Kerins, however, did not allege a nontherapeutic purpose in
her complaint. In fact, the successful operation that Dr. Gordon
performed accomplished the very therapeutic purpose it hoped to
achieve-the removal of a fibroid tumor. 4' One can only surmise
that the Kerins I court felt that Ms. Kerins's consent was vitiated by a
misrepresentation analogous to the one in Rains: Dr. Gordon misrep-
resented his health by not revealing he had just taken an AIDS test
and might be HIV-positive, just as the psychiatrists misrepresented
the therapeutic aspects of the abusive treatment to the patients in
Rains.
The Kerins I court, therefore, concluded that Ms. Kerins's allega-
tions could support an action in battery' 42 on the basis of a possible
express condition under the authority of Ashcraft
43 and Grieves 44
and the misrepresentation analogy to Rains.45
135. Id. at *19.
136. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604,278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991) (stating operation expressly condi-
tioned on use of only family-donated blood).
137. 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984) (stating procedure expressly condi-
tioned on birth of healthy baby).
138. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *17-19.
139. Id. at *19 (citing Rains v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 933, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249
(1984)).
140. 150 Cal. App. 3d 933, 940, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254 (1984).
141. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *2-3.
142. Id. at *19.
143. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991).
144. 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984).
145. 150 Cal. App. 3d 933, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1984).
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II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Fear of AIDS Cases at the Time of Kerins I and the
Previous Policy Determinations of the California
Supreme Court
The majority of jurisdictions have held that plaintiffs should not
recover for fear of AIDS absent allegations or proof of exposure to
AIDS/HIV.' 4 6 Fortunately, California's recent policy determination
in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. supports such a bright-line
rule.147 The decision in Kerins 1, however, aligned California law with
the minority position, allowing compensation for fear of AIDS with-
out alleging or proving probable exposure. The Kerins I position con-
flicted not only with the supreme court's subsequent opinion in Potter,
but directly contravened previous policy determinations in the area of
emotional distress recovery.
The bright-line limitation in the emotional distress area is illus-
trated by supreme court cases such as Borer v. American Airlines"¢
and Baxter v. Superior Court.4 9 In Borer, the mother of nine children
was injured when the cover of a lighting fixture struck her in an Amer-
ican Airlines terminal.150 The children sued for loss of parental con-
sortium.151 The supreme court denied the children relief, stating that
"'policy rather than logic is the determinative factor.' "52
Similarly in Baxter, a sixteen-year-old child was reduced to the
mental age of three, suffered hearing impairment, total blindness, and
partial paralysis as a result of the administration of a general anes-
thetic. 53 The parents of the child sued for emotional distress and the
court denied recovery "[flor the policy reasons stated in Borer [and]
the intangible nature of the injury.'
' 54
146. See infra part M.A.1.
147. See infra part lV for a discussion of the recent California Supreme Court decision
in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550
(1993) (holding that generally, absent present physical injury or illness, damages for fear of
cancer are recoverable only if more probable than not that cancer will occur).
148. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
149. 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
150. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 445, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
151. Id
152. Id at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (quoting Ekalo v. Constructive
Serv. Corp., 215 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965)).
153. Baxter, 19 Cal. 3d at 463, 563 P.2d at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
154. Id.
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In Elden v. Sheldon'55 the court denied recovery for a man who
watched his unmarried cohabitant die in an automobile accident.
156
Although the court recognized that unmarried couples are "bound by
emotional ties as strong as those that bind formally married part-
ners,' 5 7 it concluded that "[t]he need to draw a bright line in this area
of the law is essential.' 5 8  The court further stated that "[t]he
'problems of multiplication of actions and damages' that would result
from such an extension of liability would place an intolerable burden
on society."'
1 59
Extracting the policy from these decisions, it is clear that regard-
less of the genuineness of the emotional distress suffered, and the legit-
imacy of the resulting injury, not all emotional distress is
compensable. In the present dispute, no one would deny that Ms.
Kerins suffered severe emotional distress at discovering that Dr.
Gordon was HIV-positive, but the fact remained that Ms. Kerins had
not suffered a legally compensable injury. Ms. Kerins was HIV-nega-
tive, and the data supporting her test results showed that ninety-five
percent of individuals exposed to HIV will test positive after six
months. 60 Ms. Kerins tested HIV-negative more than one year after
her surgery with Dr. Gordon.' 6' Furthermore, had Ms. Kerins agreed
to be retested, the result would be accurate for up to 99.8 percent of
those individuals exposed. 62
It is inconceivable that the same court that would deny emotional
distress recovery to a mother whose child lay seemingly dead in the
street, 63 to the parents of a teenage boy rendered infantile, blind, and
paralyzed for life,i 64 to the nine children who lost the full care of their
mother, 65 and to the man who watched his live-in lover die,'66 would
allow recovery for emotional distress to a woman who had no symp-
toms of a disease, could not allege exposure to the disease, and who had
refused to be reassured of her negative condition up to a 99.8 percent
certainty.
155. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
156. IA. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
157. Id. at 273, 758 P.2d at 585-86, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
158. Id at 277, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
159. Id (quoting Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307).
160. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *5.
161. Id at *3-5.
162. Id at *5 n.2.
163. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
164.' Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
165. Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441,563 P.2d 858,138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
166. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
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Therefore, the Kerins I court blatantly disregarded stare decisis
and the difficult policy considerations behind the aforementioned Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decisions by allowing Ms. Kerins to seek emo-
tional distress compensation for her present fear of a disease that had
not yet manifested itself and in all probability never would.167 Com-
pare Ms. Kerins's claim for present distress over an "improbable fu-
ture injury" with the present distress of the plaintiffs who were denied
recovery for their emotional distress in the cases above and the result
is clear: California could not ultimately adopt the minority position of
recovery for emotional distress absent probable exposure to HIV/
AIDS without seriously compromising its previous policy
determinations.
Part IV reveals that the California Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.168 mandated alignment
with the majority position in fear of AIDS cases, therefore maintain-
ing consistency in its approach to emotional distress recovery. How-
ever, an overview of the two methodologies at the time of the Kerins I
opinion will help to reveal the flawed logic of the Kerins I appellate
court.
1. The majority jurisdiction approach at the time of Kerins I
In the majority of jurisdictions, in order to recover for the fear of
contracting AIDS in the future, a plaintiff must prove probable expo-
sure to the disease.169 In Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospi-
tals, ' 70 a patient infected with AIDS bit a police officer employed by
the university.17 1 The officer, who had not been informed of the pa-
tient's infected status, was called to help when the patient became un-
167. Kerins , 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *23 n.6.
168. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 170-92. However, proof of probable exposure to
HIV from an HIV-infected physician is easier to show today than in 1986. See MMWR,
supra note 38, at 5. The current CDC recommendations advise that, in addition to pro-
tective barrier techniques, health care workers who perform exposure-prone procedures
should: (1) know their HIV status-this was not a requirement in 1986 when Dr. Gordon
performed his surgery; and (2) not perform exposure-prone procedures unless an expert
review panel has determined under what conditions, if any, they may continue performing
such procedures. See idL These guidelines will significantly reduce a recurrence of a Kerins
I-type incident, and if such an incident were still to occur, the breach of the duty of care
can now be more readily shown. Moreover, in either a majority or minority jurisdiction, if
one has HIV-positive test results, a cause of action for emotional distress may rest on that
positive test alone, providing that the causal link to the defendant's conduct is shown.
170. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
171. Id at 891.
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ruly.172 The officer assisted the medical staff in restraining the patient,
and the patient, who had his own blood in and around his mouth at
the time,173 then bit the officer.174 The officer prevailed at the trial
level in his action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,175 and
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed.176
It was undisputed that the officer had been exposed to the blood
of the AIDS-infected patient.177 The court noted that the bite caused
the officer to bleed, mixing his blood with that of the AIDS-infected
patient.1 78 Even the expert for the hospital conceded that there had
been exposure. 17 9 The court discussed other fear of AIDS cases and
stated that "before a recovery for emotional distress damages may be
made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there must
first be exposure to the disease. If there is no exposure, then emo-
tional distress damages will be denied.'
180
In Hare v. State,'8 ' the "no exposure, no recovery rule" was reit-
erated in similar circumstances-but this time to deny compensation.
Hare dealt with a hospital employee bitten by an inmate who was
transferred to the hospital after a suicide attempt. 8 2 The appellate
court affirmed the lower court's determination that the fear was un-
reasonable as a matter of law because there was no proof that the
inmate had RIV/AIDS; therefore, there was no proof of exposure.'
8 3
172. Id
173. Evidence at trial showed that the patient had bitten himself and drawn his own
blood prior to biting the officer. Id.
174. ld.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 897.
177. Id. at 893.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (denying mortician who embalmed AIDS-infected body recovery
for fear of AIDS in spite of contact with deceased's bodily fluids because protective gear
was worn and no proof of puncture or exposure to AIDS virus was shown), overruled on
other grounds by Courtney v. Courtney, 37 S.E.2d 436, 443 (W. Va. 1993) (stating that
claims for severe emotional distress are governed by two-year statute of limitations, rather
than one year as stated in Gregory).
181. 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y. 1991).
182. Id. at 126.
183. Id. at 127; see also Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(denying surgeon who unknowingly operated on HIV-positive patient recovery for fear of
AIDS because no puncture of surgical gear or unusual occurrence and therefore no proof
of exposure to AIDS).
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As a result, the court held that the plaintiff's emotional distress was
too remote and speculative to be compensable. 184
In Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,185 the plaintiff was
an in vitro fertilization participant who learned that the donated pla-
centa had tested positive for HIIV antibodies. 86 Although the plaintiff
tested 1IV-negative, she experienced severe emotional distress . 87
The hospital later retested the placenta and found that the initial test
had been a false-positive, and that the plaintiff had never been ex-
posed to AIDS.'8
Regardless of the donated placenta's initial HIV-positive result,
the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the placenta had subsequently
tested positive justified the affirmance of summary judgment against
her emotional distress claim. 189 Distress without actual exposure, ac-
cording to the court, "simply is not enough. [Plaintiff] cannot recover,
in her asymptomatic state, monetary damages for a risk or fear of de-
veloping AIDS in the future."'19 0 Thus, even a rationally based fear of
exposure to AIDS based on the first positive test was not sufficient,
absent some indication that the plaintiff was suffering symptoms indic-
ati;ve of exposure.
Lastly, in Neal v. Neal,191 a wife sought emotional distress dam-
ages where she feared contracting AIDS-or some other sexually
transmitted disease-from her husband's extramartial affair. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment
against the wife concluding that "in order to be actionable, a plain-
tiff's fear of a disease must be based on more than the mere possibility
of exposure to a disease."' 92
The above cases quite clearly illustrate the majority position ig-
nored by Kerins I: Without proof of exposure to HlV or its causative
agents, there can be no recovery for present emotional distress based
on the fear of contracting AIDS in the future.
184. Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
185. 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id at 5.
190. Id; see also Burk v. Sage Prods., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (denying
paramedic stuck by disposed needle recovery for fear of AIDS because no proof existed
needle had been used on AIDS patient and paramedic was HIV-negative on five occa-
sions-therefore no exposure to AIDS was established).
191. 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993), aff'd in part, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994) (hold-
ing that fear of disease claim must include allegation of exposure).
192. 1d at 889.
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2. The minority jurisdiction approach at the time of Kerins I
The court in Kerins I relied on Faya v. Almaraz,193 a case repre-
sentative of the minority jurisdiction approach to fear of AIDS cases.
The minority rule states that where there is no proof of exposure to
HIV/AIDS, there still may be recovery for the emotional distress suf-
fered during the period that the plaintiff must wait before receiving
MV-negative test results.
Almaraz, as discussed above, 94 reversed a lower court's demur-
rer denying two patients of an HIV-positive surgeon recovery for their
fear of contracting AIDS even though (1) they could not prove or
allege exposure to MlV, and (2) they both tested HIV-negative one
year after their respective surgeries. 95
The appellate court in Almaraz relied on Carroll v. Sisters of St.
Francis Health Services. 96 In Carroll, the court held that the plaintiff,
a hospital visitor, could recover for her fear of acquiring AIDS after
being pricked by needles that were possibly AIDS-contaminated-
even though there was no proof of her exposure to AIDS or HIV.197
The period of recovery allowed in Carroll, as in Almaraz, was the
time between the plaintiff's needle injury and the receipt of her HIV-
negative test results. 98
193. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
194. See supra part II.B.3.
195. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 336. Interestingly, at the trial court level Almaraz followed
the majority approach to fear of AIDS. The trial court, before the reversal by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, sustained the demurrer to the two patients' actions stating that
"without proof of exposure, that is, without a positive HIV test, the plaintiff cannot present
compensable damages." Faya v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90345011, 1991 WL 317023, at *4
(Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991); Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, No. 90344028, 1991 WL 166924, at
*4 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991).
196. No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1992).
197. Id. at *4-5. The dissent in Carroll, however, was representative of the majority
approach-that absent proof of exposure the claim should not be allowed. "The unsub-
stantiated fear that one may have been exposed to the AIDS virus is not a sufficient basis
under our authorities to support a claim for emotional distress." ld. at *18 (Highers, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id. at *14. Interestingly, Carroll-the very opinion relied upon by Almaraz for
allowing recovery absent exposure to HI"V or AIDS-was reversed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1993). The supreme court stated that "[i]n order to recover emotional damages based on
the fear of contracting AIDS, the plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that he or she was
actually exposed to HIV." Id. at 594. Carroll, therefore, is now consistent with the major-
ity jurisdiction approach to fear of AIDS.
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B. The Battery Cases
1. The distinction between medical battery and medical negligence:
Cobbs v. Grant
The trial court in Kerins I relied on Cobbs v. Grant'99 to dismiss
Ms. Kerins's allegations of battery. Cobbs confronted the issue of
whether a patient may assert a claim of battery against a doctor for
performing a procedure to which the patient has consented, where the
doctor fails to disclose an improbable yet inherent risk to the proce-
dure, and that risk then materializes. 0 *
The plaintiff in Cobbs suffered from a duodenal ulcer.201 Dr.
Grant, his surgeon, explained the nature of the operation to the plain-
tiff but failed to disclose the inherent low probability risks attendant
,to the surgery.202 After the procedure was performed, the plaintiff's
ulcer seemed to disappear, and he was released from the hospital.0 3
Upon returning home, the plaintiff experienced severe abdominal
pain and was advised to return to the hospital. 20 4 At the hospital, the
plaintiff went into shock, and emergency surgery revealed an injury to
the plaintiff's spleen which necessitated its removal. 20 5 Inherent in
the first procedure to which the plaintiff had consented was a five-
percent risk of a spleen injury requiring surgery.20 6
Subsequent to the original surgery, the plaintiff also developed a
second ulcer.20 7 This "new" ulcer was also an inherent risk of the sur-
gery first performed on the plaintiff, and required a third operation to
remove fifty percent of the plaintiff's stomach.20 8 The plaintiff had
one last complication as a result of his surgery-the premature ab-
sorption of a suture.20 9 This, too, was a risk inherent in the first
surgery.
210
The jury, in a general verdict, found for the plaintiff in the
amount of $45,000.211 The California Supreme Court reversed and re-
199. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
200. Id. at 239-41, 502 P.2d at 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12.
201. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
202. Id.
203. Id.




208. Id., 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id., 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
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manded citing error: Because the verdict was a general one, the court
was not able to tell if the jury award was based on the theory of viti-
ated consent-battery-or lack of informed consent-negligence.
212
As a result, to assist on retrial, the court set out standards showing
when such an action would lie in battery, and when it would lie in
negligence.213
Although the court found the question a "close" one, it stated:
The battery theory should be reserved for those circum-
stances when a doctor performs an operation to which the
patient has not consented. When the patient gives permis-
sion to perform one type of treatment and the doctor per-
forms another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to
deviate from the consent given is present. However, when
the patient consents to certain treatment and the doctor per-
forms that treatment but an undisclosed inherent complica-
tion with a low probability occurs, no intentional deviation
from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in ob-
taining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to
disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action
should be pleaded in negligence.214
The California Supreme Court discussed the policy reasons which
supported the majority's rule of pleading such actions in negligence:
[M]ost jurisdictions have permitted a doctor in an informed
consent action to interpose a defense that the disclosure he
omitted to make was not required within his medical com-
munity. However, expert opinion as to community standard
is not required in a battery count, in which the patient must
merely prove failure to give informed consent and a mere
touching absent consent. Moreover a doctor could be held
liable for punitive damages under a battery count, and if held
liable for the intentional tort of battery he might not be cov-
ered by his malpractice insurance.215
2. The "express condition" cases
Ms. Kerins, distinguishing her case from Cobbs,21 6 alleged that
she had consented to the operation on the condition it was performed
212. IA
213. Id at 239, 502 P.2d at 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
214. Id. at 240-41, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
215. Id. at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
216. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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by a healthy doctor.2 17 As previously discussed, Ms. Kerins first made
this allegation only after the grant of summary judgment by the trial
court.21 8 Ms. Kerins's express condition allegation relied on two Cali-
fornia cases, Ashcraft v. King219 and Grieves v. Superior Court."
In Grieves, Cheryl Grieves, a pregnant woman, consented to a
postpartum tubal ligation on the condition that the surgery be done
only if her child was born free of any abnormalities2 21 After Mrs.
Grieves gave birth to a daughter, the tubal ligation was performed. 2
Immediately after the procedure, Mrs. Grieves was informed that the
child had been diagnosed with a genetic disorder, trisomy 18.2 3 The
child died two months after the diagnosis?224
Mrs. Grieves and her husband brought suit against the hospital,
the surgeon, and the surgeon's assistant seeking damages for medical
malpractice, wrongful life, and wrongful death.2 The trial court sus-
tained the defendants' demurrers with leave to amend, and the plain-
tiffs thereafter amended their complaint to include allegations of
battery z2 6 The trial court then sustained the defendants' demurrers to
the battery cause of action without leave to amend?227
The plaintiffs appealed, and the court held that the complaint was
sufficient to state a cause of action in battery? 8 The appellate court
noted that the issue of whether Mrs. Grieves's consent to the tubal
ligation was conditioned on the birth of a healthy child was an issue of
fact to be determined at the trial level?"9
The Grieves court distinguished Cobbs by stating, "Cobbs refers
to complications which result from a surgical procedure, not complica-
tions which occur prior to surgery." 3° In Cobbs, the subsequent sur-
geries that the plaintiff endured were all low probability inherent risks
attendant to and resulting from that particular surgery;-, in Grieves,
217. Kerins I, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *14-15.
218. See supra text accompanying note 134.
219. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991).
220. 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984).
221. Id. at 162, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 557. A tubal ligation is a procedure that prevents
pregnancy. Id. at 162 n.1, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 557 n.1.





227. Id. at 163, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
228. Id. at 165-66, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
229. Id. at 165, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
230. Id. at 165, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
231. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
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the appellate court felt that the risk was not inherent, nor was it a
result of the surgery-consent was simply conditioned on the birth of
a healthy baby. 32
In Ashcraft v. King, 33 Daisy Ashcraft, a sixteen-year-old girl di-
agnosed with scoliosis,234 was referred to orthopedic specialist Dr.
John D. King. In a presurgery interview, Dr. King explained that
Daisy might need blood during the surgical procedure. 3  Daisy's
mother, Lulu Ashcraft, stated that she only wanted Daisy to have
"'family blood.' ,236 Dr. King replied" 'that's fine' "237 and informed
Mrs. Ashcraft to contact the hospital to arrange for the donations. 
2 3
Although Mr. and Mrs. Ashcraft, as well as several other members of
their family, gave blood before and during the operation, the blood
used in the procedure was from the general supply at the hospital and
not from the family donors.2 39
The surgery on Daisy was performed in 1983; at that time, no test
had been developed that could identify HI-tainted blood.240 In
1987, however, the hospital informed the Ashcrafts that Daisy had
been transfused with -blood donated from an HIV-positive source?'4 1
Daisy was then tested for HIV. She was HIV-positive 4'
Daisy brought a medical malpractice suit against Dr. King on the-
ories of negligence and battery.243 The trial court granted Dr. King's
motion for a nonsuit on the issue of battery, and submitted the case to
the jury only on the theory of negligence.2 44 The jury, after five days
of deliberation, found in favor of Dr. King.'
The court of appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court as to
the nonsuit of battery, and remanded the battery cause of action to
the trial court. 4 6 The court of appeal felt that the trial court's failure
232. Grieves, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
233. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991).
234. Scoliosis is a condition involving curvature of the spine which can become debilitat-
ing if left uncorrected. Id. at 608, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
235. Id.
236. L at 612, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (quoting Lulu Ashcraft's conversation with Dr.
King).
237. Id. at 613, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (quoting Dr. King's response to Mrs. Ashcraft).
238. Id.







246. Id. at 617, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
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to instruct the jury as to the alleged battery was error, and that the
instructions as to Dr. King's negligence were not adequate to negate
the error since the jury did not have the chance to consider the theory
of conditional consent- 47 The court of appeal held that Daisy's evi-
dence as to the condition that only family-donated blood was to be
used was sufficient to defeat a nonsuit on the issue of battery.248 The
court of appeal stated:
Evidence in this case showed defendant had permission
to operate on [the] condition [that] he used family-donated
blood but that he operated using blood from the hospital's
general supply. Under the rationale of Cobbs, this evidence
was sufficient to allow the jury to infer an intent to willfully
disregard plaintiff's conditional consent.2 49
It is clear, therefore, that both Ashcraft and Grieves were found
to be outside the rule of Cobbs because the plaintiffs had placed an
express condition on their consent to a surgical procedure, which,
when disregarded, negated their consent-thus constituting a battery.
IV. KERzNS II AND TH ANALOGY TO POTTER V. FIRESTONE TRE
& RUBBER CO.
The California Supreme Court used their decision in Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 50 to reverse and remand Kerins L
Although Potter was a bold and invaluable decision with regard to the
erroneous fear of AIDS determination made in Kerins I,' 1- Potter was
not on point with respect to the battery cause of action. This section,
therefore, shall reveal the facts and holding of Potter, as well as the
court's reversal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim
in Kerins I. Part V will analyze the Potter decision as applied to the
battery cause of action by the Kerins II appellate court on remand.
A. , The Facts and Holding of Potter
When Kerins I was granted certiorari, the California Supreme
Court was about to render a decision in Potter.52 Potter aligns Cali-
fornia with jurisdictions requiring more than mere exposure to a dis-
247. Id. at 615-16, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
248. I at 612, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
249. Id. at 613, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
250. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
251. See infra part IV.A-B.
252. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
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ease to warrant recovery,2- 3 holding that even where there is
established exposure to the causative agent of a disease, in the ab-
sence of a present physical injury the plaintiff must prove, corrobo-
rated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more probable
than not that the disease will develop in the future.254
In Potter, the plaintiffs ingested toxic chemicals that the defend-
ant knowingly and unlawfully deposited in a neighboring landfill, con-
taminating the plaintiffs' water supply. 55 The trial court, finding the
defendant negligent, acknowledged the plaintiffs' present fear of de-
veloping cancer in the future after direct exposure to carcinogens.5 6
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment,2 7 holding that: (1) due to
the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs' ingestion, they need not
establish a present physical injury to recover for their fear of cancer;
and (2) the plaintiffs' present fear of cancer was certain, and as such
they need not prove that it was probable that they would develop can-
cer in the future.5 8
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the court of ap-
peal's approach. The supreme court stated that although the plaintiffs
must establish the reasonableness of their fear of cancer, the court of
appeal "erred in concluding that reasonableness is established by the
mere fact of an exposure to, or a significant increase in, the risk of
cancer." 259 The court went on to state that
exposure, without more, does not provide a basis for fearing
future physical injury or illness which the law is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.... [W]ithout any regard to the na-
253. See, ag., Nesom v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
absent proof material used in surgery contained Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease-a fatal neuro-
logical disorder-there could be no recovery for fear of developing disease); Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that damages are
permissible where fear of cancer results from exposure to asbestos); Maddy v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that demonstration of expo-
sure is essential to any claim of personal injury arising from toxic exposure); Barth v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that plaintiff
was permitted to seek recovery for fear of cancer due to exposure to cancer-causing tox-
ins); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding
that in utero exposure to DES was sufficient for recovery of emotional distress damages
due to fear of cancer).
254. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 997, 863 P.2d at 816, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
255. Id. at 975, 863 P.2d at 801, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
256. Id. at 977-78, 863 P.2d at 802-03, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557-58.
257. Except with regard to the appellate court's award for continued medical monitor-
ing and the postjudgment order directing the defendant to pay costs and interest. Id. at
979, 863 P.2d at 804, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
258. Id.
259. lId at 989, 863 P.2d at 810-11, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565-66.
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ture, magnitude and proportion of the exposure or its likely
consequences, [mere exposure] provides no meaningful basis
upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of one's fear.260
The Potter court recognized that a plaintiff fearing a twenty-to-
thirty percent chance of developing a disease is not unreasonable as a
matter of law. Nonetheless, the court felt public policy dictated that
unless developing the disease is probable, emotional recovery should
be denied.261
The facts of Potter, however, presented unique circumstances
which the court did not ignore: Because the defendant knowingly
dumped toxic waste, it acted with conscious disregard of the plaintiffs'
safety. With this in mind, the court created an exception to the "more
probable than not" standard: Where a defendantacts with oppres-
sion, fraud, or malice,262 and the plaintiff -can establish that the de-
fendant's breach caused exposure, the plaintiff need not meet the
more probable than not standard.2 63 In this instance the plaintiff must
merely show that the fear stems from knowledge-corroborated by
medical science-that the risk of cancer is significantly increased and
has resulted in an actual risk of cancer.26
260. lid, 863 P.2d at 811, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566.
261. Id. at 990, 863 P.2d at 811, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566. The public policy concerns
engendered by allowing recovery to these plaintiffs were as follows: (1) the need to restrict
the creation of an unlimited class of potential plaintiffs, i& at 991, 863 P.2d at 812, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 567; (2) the detrimental effect on the health care field in the area of prescrip-
tion drugs-whose potential effects may not develop for years-and the potential class of
plaintiffs who may seek recovery with no physical injury for fear of adverse effects of these
drugs, id at 991-92, 863 P.2d at 812-13, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567-68; (3) the consequence of
allowing recovery to those who have fear of cancer-and yet may never develop the dis-
ease-may be to seriously diminish the capability of defendants and their insurers to ade-
quately compensate those who do legitimately develop the disease, id. at 993, 863 P.2d at
813, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 568; and (4) the need to have a "sufficiently definite and predictable
threshold for recovery" for consistency in case-by-case adjudication, id. at 993, 863 P.2d at
813, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568-69.
262. The court referenced California Civil Code § 3294 for the definition of these terms,
and stated that an example of such conduct would be exemplified by" 'despicable conduct
which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others.'" Id. at 998, 863 P.2d at 817, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572 (quoting CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West 1994)).
263. I& at 999-1000, 863 P.2d at 818, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
264. Id. It could be argued that if Dr. Gordon was aware he might have been HIV-
positive when he operated on Ms. Kerins, he acted with a conscious disregard of her safety.
Had that been the case, Ms. Kerins might have been able to bypass the more-probable-
than-not standard under Potter. Hypothetically, the analysis would then focus on whether
Ms. Kerins could show that her fear stemmed from knowledge corroborated by medical
science that her risk of contracting HIV had been increased and had resulted in an actual
risk of AIDS. The relevant medical data, however, actually revealed that Ms. Kerins's risk
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B. Kerins II: The Impact of Potter Reverses Kerins I
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kerins I, and,
after the questionable judgment displayed by the Kerins I court, the
supreme court merely ordered-in a one sentence opinion-that the
court of appeal "vacate its decision and.., reconsider the cause in
light of Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co."2 65 In short, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court never discussed the merits of the issue or the
facts of the case, thus missing the opportunity to issue a seminal deci-
sion regarding fear of AIDS.
The result on remand is not surprising. In Kerins 11,266 the court
of appeal reversed its original position. The Kerins II court perfuncto-
rily dismissed its logic in Kerins I by stating:
Without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Pot-
ter v. Firestone ... we rejected the approach of several other
jurisdictions which consider emotional distress damages due
to fear of AIDS legally noncompensable unless the plaintiff
alleges and proves actual exposure, and it is more probable
than not that the plaintiff will actually develop the disease.267
1. The emotional distress claim in light of Potter
The Kerins H opinion goes through the Potter "more probable
than not" test,2 68 finding that Ms. Kerins's cause of action for fear of
AIDS would not stand.2 69 The court in Kerins II then stated that the
defendant in Potter had a duty to any foreseeable person coming into
contact with its toxic waste. 7 0 Therefore, the Kerins II court held that
Dr. Gordon had an analogous duty to a patient such as Ms. Kerins
who might, during surgery, make foreseeable contact with his
blood. 7 1
The Kerins H court concluded, however, that no breach of that
duty could be found by Dr. Gordon, because even if he knew he was
infected with HIV at the time of surgery, the CDC guidelines in 1986
of contracting AIDS was infinitesimal. See supra note 38. Therefore, even if this line of
analysis were pursued, the result under Potter would still be the same-Ms. Kerins would
not have been able to show that she had an actual risk of contracting AIDS.
265. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
266. Kerins II, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (1994).
267. Id at 1066-67, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174 (citation omitted).
268. See supra part IV.A.
269. Kerins II, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 1074, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.
270. Id at 1072, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
271. Id
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did not require that he disclose this to his patients.27 2 Therefore, Ms.
Kerins's claimed emotional distress was not proximately caused by a
breach of any legal duty on the part of Dr. Gordon. As such, Ms.
Kerins's complaint, in light of Potter, was estopped from going any
further.273 Interestingly, that was the first time the appellate court
considered any analysis of "duty" relevant; however, had they done
such an analysis in Kerins I, the result would have been identical.
Assured that they were now safely within the confines of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's policy, the Kerins II court went out of its way
to expose the absurdity of the cause of action it once championed.2 74
The Kerins II opinion suggested that, even assuming Ms. Kerins's in-
quiries about Dr. Gordon's health created a higher duty of disclo-
sure,2 75 her claim would still fail under the Potter "more probable than
not standard. 27 6 The court in Kerins HI finally admitted that the evi-
dence at trial revealed that "there remained only the most speculative
possibility that [Ms. Kerins] would actually develop AIDS at some
point in the future. According to Potter, no recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress is permitted. '2 77
The ultimate contradiction in the Kerins II analysis is that the
court only then found Ms. Kerins's fear of AIDS unreasonable as a
matter of law. Without even discussing the fact that Ms. Kerins could
not prove or allege exposure to HIV, the court stated that "[t]he rec-
ord clearly establishes that there is no 'significant' risk that [Ms. Ker-
ins] will in the future develop AIDS as the result of exposure to HIV
during the surgery performed by Dr. Gordon. This makes [Ms. Ker-
ins's] fear of AIDS unreasonable as a matter of law."'2 7 If the record
had so "clearly established" that there was no risk of HIV transmis-
sion to Ms. Kerins-why was it only clear to the appellate court then?
The record in Kerins II was no different from what it was one year
earlier in Kerins I.
272. Al.; see also Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-Infected Health Care Professiona" Em-
ployment Policies and Public Health, 18 LAW, MED. & HE-ALTH CARE 311, 313-24 (1990)
(stating that 1986 CDC standards did not require disclosure of health care worker's H1V-
positive status) (citing Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IJI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus During Inva-
sive Procedures, Moiawrry & MORTALrrY Wa.-y. REP., Apr. 11, 1986, at 221-23).
273. See id. at 1072, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177-78.
274. See id. at 1077, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
275. Id. at 1072, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
276. Id
277. Id. at 1074, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
278. Id. at 1075, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180.
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V. ThE BATrERY CAUSE OF ACrION AFTER POTTER
The Kerins II court's analysis with regard to the battery cause of
action was virtually nonexistent. Observing that no discussion of bat-
tery was present in the Potter opinion, the court analogized to Potter
and stated that
[s]ince [Ms. Kerins's] fear of developing AIDS is not based
on knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific
opinion, that her risk of developing AIDS has significantly
increased and has resulted in an actual risk of AIDS that is
significant, she cannot recover emotional distress damages
on a technical battery theory.279
This analysis was deficient in several areas. First, Ms. Kerins's
complaint was not for emotional distress damages based on battery,
but rather damages for the unconsented-to touching itself. The emo-
tional distress damages flowing from the actual battery were covered
by the fear of AIDS claim; the award sought for the alleged battery
perpetrated by Dr. Gordon was entirely different. Yet the court in
Kerins II failed to address the battery claim as a separate entity.280
Fortunately, however, the Kerins II court could not sustain the
battery claim due to the California Supreme Court's wholesale rever-
sal of Kerins L But having failed to resolve the battery issue for the
appellate court on remand, the California Supreme Court has allowed
plaintiffs to end run the policy of protecting physicians from unwar-
ranted intentional tort liability.281 A plaintiff under the Kerins I stan-
dard need only allege circumstantial factors that create an implied
condition-for example, the question, "How is your health?"-and
they may circumvent the policies established in Cobbs v. Grant282 and
bring a suit for battery. Therefore, the battery analysis in Kerins I
could create a new exception to Cobbs v. Grant-that of implied con-
dition to an effective consent.
The cases cited by the Kerins I court in support of Ms. Kerins's
express condition theory are Ashcraft v. King283 and Grieves v. Supe-
rior Court.2  Both cases reveal that express conditions, as opposed to
279. Id. at 1077, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
280. Id
281. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240-41, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972).
282. Id.
283. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991).
284. 157 Cal. App. 3d'159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984).
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implied conditions, were placed on the consent to the particular
procedure.
In Ashcraft, the express condition to spinal surgery was the use of
only family-donated blood.285 The court held that the fact that the
blood used was from the general hospital supply and not that of family
donors was sufficient to state a cause of action in battery.286 Similarly,
in Grieves the express condition placed on the consent to a tubal liga-
tion was the birth of a healthy child.287 The operation was performed
in violation of that express condition-the child was not born
healthy-and the court determined that the action sounded in
battery.288
Both Ashcraft and Grieves had express and unequivocal condi-
tions placed on the consent to the performed procedure. If the condi-
tion is express and unequivocal, and the physician exceeds the terms
of that condition, then the consent does not become operative and the
act of performing the procedure is a battery.289 In Kerins I, however,
there was no express or unequivocal condition placed on the consent
given.290 The Kerins I court instead relied on circumstances to create
an implied condition, thereby recognizing it as an exception to the
rule of Cobbs.291 Nowhere in Cobbs, Ashcraft, or Grieves is the the-
ory of implied condition accepted as either the equivalent to an ex-
press condition or as an exception to the rule of Cobbs.
"Express" may be defined as "exact, precise [and] specific,"'
while a "condition" may be defined as "a premise upon which the
fulfillment of an agreement depends. 293 California case law has de-
fined an express condition as one that is created by the intent of the
285. Ashcraft, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 612-13, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
286. See id. at 613, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
287. Grieves, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 162, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
288. Id. at 165-66, 203 Cal. Rptr.- at 559-60.
289. See discussion of Ashcraft and Grieves, supra part m.B.2.
290. Although, arguably, the determination of whether a condition was express is a
question of fact, it is this Author's opinion that the mere statement "How is your health?"
could not be labeled an express condition by any reasonable trier of fact. However, the
statement could perhaps constitute an implied condition. Thus, this Author's conclusion is
that a cause of action depending on such a condition would be a new exception to actions
normally brought in negligence.
291. See supra part H.B.1 for a discussion of Cobbs v. Grant.
292. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGiATE DIcrioNARY 410 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 10th
ed. 1993).
293. Id. at 240.
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parties to the agreement and is stated with precision. 94 Additionally,
the cases that the Ashcraft court cited reveal that express conditions
to consent which state a cause of action in battery are those that are
explicit, not merely implied.2 95
Ms. Kerins's question to Dr. Gordon, "How is your health?"
would not be considered equivalent to the designation of an express
condition to be operated on by an HIV/AIDS-free surgeon. Even Ms.
Kerins did not initially contend that this was her intent when she
posed the question to Dr. Gordon.296 This is exemplified by Ms. Ker-
ins's deposition stating that she asked Dr. Gordon the question" 'just
somehow for some reason . . . because . . . I hadn't ever asked
hiM.' "297
The above admission by Ms. Kerins regarding the question "How
is your health?" clearly illustrates that her consent to surgery was in
no way expressly conditioned on Dr. Gordon being free of HIVIAIDS.
Furthermore, the question "How is your health?" is not even mini-
mally analogous to previous express conditions recognized by Califor-
nia courts,298 nor is it logically connected to such a specific limitation
on a surgical procedure.
Although Ms. Kerins discussed her fear of AIDS with Dr.
Gordon and stored her own blood should the need for transfusion
arise,299 these facts merely indicate that Ms. Kerins communicated
concern regarding exposure to AIDS. This is not equivalent to an ex-
press condition.
The Kerins I court stated that a liberal construction of Ms. Ker-
ins's pleadings might support the contention that an express "good
294. See Schwab v. Bridge, 27 Cal. App. 204, 206-07, 149 P. 603, 604-05 (1915); see also
Owens v. Owens, 210 Cal. App. 2d 705, 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 847, 849 (1962) (stating that
conditions precedent are "strictly construed" against relying party).
295. Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 717-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (stating
operation expressly conditioned on nonuse of spinal anesthetic); Clark v. Miller, 378
N.W.2d 838, 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating procedure expressly conditioned on discov-
ery of arthritic condition or malalignment); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97-98 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1913) (stating foot operation expressly conditioned on premise that procedure would
not entail removal of any bone); Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341,341-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932)
(stating extraction expressly conditioned upon removal of some but not all abnormal
teeth).
296. Respondent's Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court at 28, Kerins v.
Hartley, 17 Cal. App. 4th 713, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (1993) (No. B065917) (quoting Ms.
Kerins's deposition testimony).
297. IL
298. See discussion of Ashcraft and Grieves, supra part m.B.2.
299. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *6.
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health" condition was placed on her consent.300 This Author dis-
agrees. It is conceivable her question and conduct created an implied
condition-but there is no basis in the facts, as supported by California
law or the plain meaning of the words, for the establishment of an ex-
press condition. Neither Ms. Kerins's communications nor her con-
duct specifically, precisely, or unequivocally showed any intent to
expressly condition her consent to surgery on Dr. Gordon's HIV-free
status.
Ms. Kerins raised the express condition theory only after she had
failed at the trial level with her claim of negligence.30 ' Ms. Kerins's
counsel perhaps realized that negligence was not as worthy an allega-
tion as express condition because in 1986, when Dr. Gordon per-
formed the procedure, he was under no duty pursuant to the prevailing
standards laid down by the CDC to reveal his HIV-positive status.0 2
Therefore, regardless of whether he knew of his HIIV-positive condi-
tion at the time of Ms. Kerins's surgery, he was under no duty to
reveal the condition of his health to her. 0 3 Moreover, even if Dr.
Gordon was aware of his possible infection, the CDC in 1986 did not
recommend that HIV-infected health care workers stop performing
exposure-prone procedures. 3° Therefore, under the relevant CDC
guidelines, Dr. Gordon would not have considered his health as pos-
ing a risk to Ms. Kerins.
Realizing, after defeat at the trial level, that the duty of care in
1986 might not effectively support a negligence judgment, Ms. Kerins
and her attorneys must have made the strategic decision to plead an
express condition. Obviously, if Ms. Kerins had truly intended to
place an express condition on her consent she would have alleged it at
the outset, rather than waiting for a judgment to be entered against
her.30
5
The fact that the Kerins I court allowed such a transparent argu-
ment to reverse a determination grounded on the policy enumerated
in Cobbs is at best unsettling. The decision regarding battery in Ker-
ins I could now be interpreted as sanctioning pleadings that turn tradi-
tional negligence actions into intentional torts by using circumstantial
events to create an implied condition to a given consent. The net
300. 1d. at *19.
301. Id. at *15-17.
302. See Barnes et al., supra note 272, at 313-14.
303. See supra text accompanying note 272.
304. Kerins 11, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 1072, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
305. Kerins 1, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 786, at *19.
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effect of the battery decision in Kerins I is that the rule of Cobbs is
swallowed, and lack of informed consent actions against physicians
could now once again be brought as intentional torts if creatively pled.
VI. CONCLUSION
What is the aftermath of Kerins I and Kerins II? Although a
bright-line test established by the California Supreme Court in Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.30 6 has delineated when a valid claim
for fear of AIDS may lie, it is unclear whether a battery cause of ac-
tion against a physician may be supported by an implied condition
placed on the consent to treatment. As previously discussed, °7 the
arguments raised by the Kerins I court in favor of the implied condi-
tion theory were never directly refuted by either the supreme court or
by the appellate court in Kerins I.
With regard to the fear of AIDS claim, the trial court's initial
determination was, in this Author's belief, the correct one; it recog-
nized that where there is no proof of exposure to HIV, no cause of
action for fear of AIDS will lie. The California Supreme Court
adopted the trial court's standard, adding that even with exposure to a
disease, the chances of contracting the disease must be more probable
than not. But it is the appellate court's decisions and reasoning in
Kerins I and Kerins H that are disturbing.
The Kerins I court may have allowed the terror surrounding
AIDS to influence its judgment regarding Ms. Kerins's claim. The
court in Kerins I had ample legal ammunition to shoot down Ms. Ker-
ins's fear of AIDS claim. Ms. Kerins was not HIV-positive. She had
no proof of exposure. Additionally, she refused to be retested after
testing HIV-negative. Finally, Ms. Kerins herself supplied medical
data that she had an infinitesimal chance of ever contracting AIDS.
Yet the Kerins I court allowed her claim. By sanctioning recovery for
fear of AIDS without proof of exposure, the Kerins I court subjected a
vast number of HIV-positive and ADS-infected persons to potential
liability for contact with ignorant, yet terrified, AIDS-free persons.
Adding insult to injury, the Kerins II court acted as if the correct
result was apparent from the start. Although reversal by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court mandated its changed opinion, it is eerie that the
appellate court stated the record was "clear" as to the lack of
306. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
307. See supra part V.
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probability of Ms. Kerins ever becoming HIV-positive °8 when in fact
this was the same record they had previously used to allow her spuri-
ous claim.
With regard to the battery cause of action, again, the trial court's
determination was the appropriate one. Cobbs v. Grant30 9 illustrated
the mandate of the supreme court with regard to physician liability:
So long as the doctor performs the procedure to which the patient has
consented, there is no liability for battery. Later, Ashcraft v. King
310
and Grieves v. Superior Court31 held that a battery claim may lie if an
express condition to the patient's consent is disregarded.31 2 The trial
court recognized that no express condition was placed on Ms. Kerins's
consent and that the operation performed was the one consented to;
therefore, under Cobbs, no battery had occurred. Yet the Kerins I
court allowed the battery claim under Ashcraft and Grieves, although
no express condition had been stated by Ms. Kerins. As such, a new
exception to the rule of Cobbs-that of implied condition-may have
been born.
313
What is curious is the complete disregard of the battery cause of
action in both the supreme court reversal and Kerins II. By not con-
fronting the battery issue on remand, the Kerins I analysis remains in
limbo. Although officially reversed, the implied condition theory
could be resurrected if a court were to rely on circumstance to create
an implied condition to a patient's consent. Without a firm denuncia-
tion by the supreme court on this issue, physicians must now be con-
cerned with various interpretations of patient-doctor conversations,
and how those conversations, coupled with circumstance, might affect
consent. It is this Author's opinion that physicians must be concerned
with patient care and the express conditions placed on that care-not
possible permutations of casual conversations that could create im-
plied conditions.
Ultimately, the real importance of the Kerins saga is the dismissal
of the fear of AIDS claim. Kerins II, by virtue of Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. ,34 reveals that legally cognizable injuries are com-
pensable, while speculative fear is not. Kerins H illustrates that an
irrational fear of AIDS will not be tolerated; there must be proof of
308. See supra note 38.
309. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
310. 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1991).
311. 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1984).
312. See supra part HI.B.2.
313. See supra part V.
314. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
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exposure as well as a likelihood of developing the disease. Although
AIDS, unfortunately, is not a disease of the past, an unfounded fear of
AIDS can no longer give rise to litigation in California courts.
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